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Imitation is a key mechanism of human culture and underlies many of the intricacies of 6	
human social life, including rituals and social norms. Compared to other animals, 7	
humans appear to be special in their readiness to copy novel actions as well as those that 8	
are visibly causally-irrelevant. This study directly compared the imitative behavior of 9	
human children to that of bonobos, our understudied great ape relatives. During an 10	
action-copying task involving visibly causally-irrelevant actions, only 3-5 year old 11	
children (N = 77) readily copied whereas no bonobo from a large sample did (N = 46). 12	
These results highlight the distinctive nature of the human cultural capacity and 13	
contribute important insights into the development and evolution of human cultural 14	
behaviors.   15	
 16	
Debate over the uniqueness of human culture and the role that imitation plays in its 17	
evolutionary and ontogenetic development has become the focus of increasing research 18	
attention (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 19	
2009; Tomasello, 1999; Whiten, 2016). In particular, comparative research has attempted to 20	
identify what makes human culture special as compared to that of other great apes, and to 21	
identify similarities and differences in the underlying social learning mechanisms 22	
(Tomasello, 1996; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Kruger, 1993; Vale et al., 2016; 23	
Whiten, 2013; 2016). Imitation, which in this paper we define as the faithful copying of 24	
others’ body movements, has elicited particular attention as it has been proposed to form a 25	
core component of human culture, enabling the acquisition of causally opaque material 26	
culture and action-based cultures (e.g. gestures and dance) as well as contributing to their 27	
accumulation over time (Acerbi & Tennie, 2016; Dean et al., 2012; Gergely & Csibra, 2006; 28	
Tennie et al., 2009, but see Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Caldwell, Schillinger, Evans, & 29	
Hopper, 2012; Morin, 2015). Imitation is also involved in many of the complexities of human 30	
social life, including for norms, rituals and conventions (Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Legare & 31	
Watson-Jones, 2015; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). 32	
 33	
A striking feature of human imitation is the extent to which humans are prepared to imitate 34	
actions that appear causally-irrelevant (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 35	
2007; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007). This phenomenon, termed ‘over-36	
imitation’, emerges early during childhood (Lyons, Young & Keil, 2007; Over & Carpenter, 37	
2012). It occurs in both Western and non-Western cultures (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Nielsen & 38	
Tomaselli, 2010) and gradually increases with age, starting from around three years old 39	
(McGuigan, Gladstone & Cook, 2012; McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2011; McGuigan, 40	
Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007). Over-imitation is thought to underlie many human socio-41	
cultural behaviors including ritual and other forms of normative behavior (Legare & Nielsen, 42	
2015; Legare & Watson-Jones, 2015; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2015). It is also involved 43	
in cumulative technological culture, thus, it was suggested that children’s over-imitation is 44	
driven by their need to learn about causally-opaque cultural artefacts (Lyons et al., 2007). 45	
This may be especially important in cases where cultural accumulation has led to artefacts 46	
whose causal properties have become complex and opaque, i.e. copying is required to 47	
produce or use them (Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Lyons et al., 2007; Whiten, McGuigan, 48	
Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). Nevertheless, recent research has shown that over-49	
imitation is strongly motivated by social factors, such as to affiliate with or ‘be like the other’ 50	
(Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & Blank, 2011) and to conform to 51	
perceived conventions and norms (Herrmann, Legare, Harris & Whitehouse, 2013; Keupp et 52	
al., 2013; Legare & Nielsen 2015).  For instance, children are more likely to copy when the 53	
task is framed as being normative (Keupp et al. 2013; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Moraru, 54	
Gomez & McGuigan, 2016), and after being primed with third-party ostracism (Over & 55	
Carpenter, 2009a, 2009b). They can infer friendship and social status from watching others 56	
imitate (Over & Carpenter, 2015) and trust individuals more that have imitated them (Over, 57	
Carpenter, Spears, & Gattis, 2013).  58	
 59	
The study that originally reported over-imitation (Horner & Whiten, 2005) contrasted 60	
children’s copying with an apparent absence of this behavior in captive chimpanzees, a 61	
finding which has since been replicated for orangutans (Nielsen & Susianto, 2010). Children 62	
were willing to insert a stick into both an opaque and a clear box in order to retrieve a reward, 63	
even though the insertion in the latter was visibly causally-irrelevant. Although this 64	
influential study has stimulated a plethora of studies, it is limited in its ability to detect over-65	
imitation in the sense in which we define it here (i.e. with a focus on action copying). This is 66	
because pure action-copying could not be distinguished from other forms of social learning 67	
due to the fact that the captive chimpanzees were already competent stick-users. In other 68	
words, this stick-based task could detect copying of the location of the stick insertion, rather 69	
than copying the action itself. Thus, for both the apes and the children, this task more 70	
accurately tested “local over-enhancement” and/or over-emulation learning (see Tennie, Call, 71	
& Tomasello, 2006 for discussion). Note this experiment also involved a “two-target task”, 72	
where objects could be moved to one of two sides. Copying here was likewise likened with 73	
imitation; however, while this task controlled for local enhancement, it could not fully 74	
pinpoint action-based imitation as it could not exclude the so-called ‘object-movement 75	
reenactment’ (Custance, Whiten, & Fredman, 1999; Heyes & Ray, 2000). Later studies, 76	
which added actions that neither changed nor moved objects, were generally unable to find 77	
action-copying in chimpanzees (Tennie, Call & Tomasello, 2012), but found it in children 78	
(Legare, Wen, Herrmann & Whitehouse, 2015).  79	
 80	
Given these constraints and the fact that no equivalent data is yet available for the capacities 81	
of our other closest living relative, the bonobo (Pan paniscus), the question of whether over-82	
imitation is uniquely human among the great apes remains unresolved. Nevertheless, it is 83	
acknowledged that some animals will copy some actions under certain conditions (Huber et 84	
al., 2009). This includes, for example, the so-called ‘Do as I do’ studies which involve 85	
heavily-trained animals (Call, 2001; Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995; Miles, Mitchell, & 86	
Harper, 1996). There is also evidence from ‘enculturated’ great apes that have received 87	
extensive experience in human-centered environments (Bjorklund, Bering, & Ragan, 2000; 88	
Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2007; Byrne & Tanner, 2006; Call, 2001; 89	
Carrasco, Posada, & Colell, 2009; Hayes & Hayes, 1952; Miles et al., 1996).  Importantly 90	
however, the extent to which ecologically-relevant animals – i.e. those that are untrained and 91	
un-enculturated– spontaneously copy actions remains hotly debated (Whiten, 2016; Whiten, 92	
Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996; Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 93	
2004; Zentall, 1996, 2006). The lack of resolution is partly due to methodological constraints 94	
in distinguishing imitation from other social learning processes (Heyes & Ray, 2000; Tennie 95	
et al., 2006). 96	
 97	
To date, most research on great ape social learning has focused on ‘two-target’ tasks 98	
involving experimental puzzle boxes that can be opened in more than one way in order to 99	
retrieve a reward (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006; 100	
Whiten, Horner, & de Waal, 2005; Whiten et al., 1996; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini 101	
& Hopper, 2009). While two-target tasks provide many key insights into the factors shaping 102	
animal cultural transmission (Galef, 2015; Whiten, 2016), they cannot clearly distinguish 103	
imitation from other learning mechanism due to the fact that the demonstrator movements are 104	
confounded with the object movements (Custance, Whiten, & Fredman, 1999; Whiten, 105	
Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004; Whiten et al., 2009). Thus, animals can 106	
plausibly solve the tasks via emulation, which is the copying of results of actions on the 107	
environment (Heyes & Ray, 2000; Tennie et al., 2006). Moreover, given that chimpanzees 108	
are able to copy the movements of the apparatus in two-target tasks without seeing actions 109	
leading to these results (Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro & Whiten, 2008), emulation cannot be 110	
ruled out. Successful performance on two-target tasks (Custance et al., 1999) is also 111	
widespread in the animal kingdom (Galef, 2015; even in reptiles, Kis, Huber & Wilkinson, 112	
2015), thus limiting its usefulness for determining what truly makes human cultural learning 113	
special or why wild great apes, especially chimpanzees and orang-utans, are such expert tool 114	
users (Meulman & van Schaik, 2013; Sanz, Call & Boesch, 2013; Whiten et al. 1999;).  115	
 116	
Although some great apes will spontaneously copy familiar actions, (Fuhrmann, Ravignani, 117	
Marshall-Pescini, & Whiten, 2014; Tennie et al., 2012) evidence of novel action copying – 118	
i.e. which is a core component of human culture - has not been convincingly demonstrated 119	
using two-target tasks. This is because the target actions generally always fall within the 120	
species-typical repertoire, such as pulling or poking (Tennie et al., 2012). Given the 121	
importance of copying novel actions in human culture, it is essential to determine whether 122	
great apes can copy novel actions. So far, only two studies with captive chimpanzees have 123	
addressed this question, accounting for the various methodological confounds (Tennie et al., 124	
2012; Tomasello et al., 1997). Both tested imitation of novel actions where no physical 125	
information about the task was available, i.e. removing the possibility of emulation.  126	
Although one of the studies found some evidence of familiar action copying in a single 127	
chimpanzee subject (Tennie et al., 2012), neither detected novel action copying in any 128	
subject.  129	
 130	
Here, we addressed the confounds of previous studies by designing a paradigm which could 131	
test for pure over-imitation, while excluding other social learning mechanisms. We did this 132	
by using purely manual gestures as the target actions where no physical information was 133	
provided about the solution. In order to probe the potential for over-imitation, some of the 134	
target actions were visibly causally-irrelevant. We included target actions that were, to our 135	
knowledge, novel or at least very unlikely to be part of a species-typical repertoire. 136	
 137	
To promote the possibility of demonstrating imitation by great apes, we focused our attention 138	
to bonobos, a species of great ape that is equally as related to humans as chimpanzees, yet 139	
comparatively less studied. For a number of reasons, bonobos may represent a more 140	
promising candidate species to demonstrate imitation than chimpanzees. This is because 141	
bonobos outperform chimpanzees on socio-cognitive tasks (Herrmann, Hare, Call, & 142	
Tomasello, 2010), show enhanced social orientation (Kano, Hirata, & Call, 2015; Kret, 143	
Jaasma, Bionda, & Wijnen, 2016) and high levels of social tolerance (Hare & Kwetuenda, 144	
2010). Given the inherently social nature of imitation, an activity requiring both social 145	
attention and social tolerance, the enhanced social orientation of bonobos may enhance their 146	
imitative capacity. The current study explored evidence for pure, spontaneous action 147	
imitation in a large sample of untrained and non-enculturated sanctuary-living bonobos as 148	
compared to three-to-five year old children.  This sample is the largest of its kind ever used 149	
with a single great ape species for a pure action imitation study. If lower social tolerance and 150	
the methodological constraints emerging from the nature of previous tasks impede the 151	
performance of great apes, we should expect bonobos to show evidence of over-imitation. If 152	
over-imitation is a human unique behavior, we should not expect bonobos to copy any of the 153	





Seventy-seven typically-developing children, aged three-to-five years, participated in this 159	
study (Mean age= 4.4 years; Range = 3.1–5.9 years; N = 43 males).  We selected this age 160	
range as children of this age are already manually competent, show reliable evidence of 161	
imitation behavior (e.g. Horner & Whiten, 2005; Hopper et al., 2008; McGuigan et al. 2007; 162	
Whiten et al., 1996) and are comfortable being tested individually, enabling more cross-163	
species comparisons. Children were recruited from ThinkTank Science Museum in 164	
Birmingham, West Midlands, UK and randomly assigned to conditions. Child testing took 165	
place between April - December 2016. Using parental questionnaires, we determined that all 166	
were typically developing, had normal or corrected to normal vision and spoke English as 167	
their first language: 69 children were monolingual, while 8 were bi-lingual (English + 168	
Urdu/Punjabi/Spanish/Sinhalese/French/Arabic/Polish). The sample comes from an area of 169	
high ethnic diversity consisting of approximately 58% Caucasian, 27% Asian/British Asian, 170	
9% Black/African/Caribbean, 6% Mixed children; the participants came from Working-171	
Middle class backgrounds (estimated from census data for each county, Office of National 172	
Statistics, 2011).  Five children refused to participate in the task and were excluded from 173	
analyses. The remaining children were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (N = 27 174	
in the ‘Rub & rotate’ condition (uncommon actions); N = 26 in the ‘Cross & trace’ condition 175	
(typical actions) and N = 19 in the Control condition).  176	
 177	
Forty-six non-enculturated and untrained bonobos also participated (Mean age = 11.3 years, 178	
Range 3–29 years, N = 25 males). Testing took place in June 2015. The bonobos were 179	
housed at Lola ya Bonobo Sanctuary, a naturalistic forested sanctuary, in the Mont Ngafula 180	
district, Kinshasa, DR Congo, see SI text for more information. The majority of subjects were 181	
orphans, having arrived at the sanctuary as victims of the bush-meat and pet trades. Three 182	
were born and mother-reared at the Sanctuary. Following several years of rehabilitation 183	
within a cohort group, individuals are integrated into large, mixed-age groups. The majority 184	
of our subjects (N = 36) were housed in large, outdoor enclosures. We additionally tested 10 185	
juveniles housed in a Nursery. Nursery individuals were cared for by human substitute 186	
mothers within a naturalistic forested enclosure with age-matched peers. For subjects from 187	
the main enclosures, the experiments were conducted in their sleeping dormitories and before 188	
their morning feed in order to maximize motivation. Testing rooms (15m2) had a meshed 189	
ceiling with wide bars through which the experimenter could hand items to the subject, which 190	
they could then manipulate themselves inside their testing room. In the Nursery, the 191	
experiments were conducted face to face with the experimenter within their enclosures and 192	
sleeping dormitories. 193	
 194	
Materials and Procedure 195	
For all participants, the task involved the opening of a small box (10 x 6 x 3 cm, Figure 1), 196	
made of two halves of a single piece of wood. A small chamber was carved out in the middle 197	
to place the reward, held in place by a peg-and-hole mechanism. 198	
 199	
For both test conditions, each participant first took part in a demonstration phase followed by 200	
a test phase. All participants were tested individually in a quiet testing area. Children’s 201	
parents waited behind an occluder so were not visible. All participants observed a human 202	
demonstrator who, facing the participant, looked at the box and then slowly performed two 203	
consecutive actions onto it, before opening it to reveal the reward inside, which was provided 204	
to the participant. Due to health and safety reasons, children received stickers, while bonobos 205	
received a food reward (apple piece) – as is typical in such cross-species studies (e.g. Hopper 206	
et al., 2008; Herrmann & Tomasello, 2015). This procedure was repeated three times.  207	
Between demonstrations, the demonstrator refilled the box behind an occluder, preventing the 208	
refilling and closing from being seen.  209	
 210	
We tested imitation for actions that we considered plausibly typical or uncommon, based 211	
upon our direct observations of actions performed by bonobos and children and our 212	
knowledge of their typical manual behaviors. In the ‘uncommon’ action condition (‘Rub-213	
Rotate’), the demonstrator placed the back of the right hand on the top of the box and slowly 214	
rubbed it in a clockwise circular motion four times. Next, the demonstrator raised the right 215	
hand into the air next to the box and slowly rotated the wrist four times. Given the difficulty 216	
in ascertaining whether a demonstrated behavior is truly novel for a long-lived species 217	
(Zentall, 2001), we considered these two actions to be ‘uncommon’ on the basis that, to our 218	
knowledge, they had not been previously observed in the study population or any other 219	
observed by the authors, and were also unlikely to occur within the species-typical repertoire. 220	
We also included a ‘typical’ action condition (‘Cross-Trace’), which included actions that 221	
were rare but nevertheless fell within the ape species-typical repertoire, and have also been 222	
observed in this bonobo population (Z. Clay, personal observations).  Here, the demonstrator 223	
held the box (left hand) and with the index finger, slowly traced a diagonal cross across the 224	
top of the box. Next, the demonstrator used this finger to trace around the groove of the box, 225	
around its full diameter. There was also a Control Condition (children only), in which 226	
everything remained the same except that no target actions were demonstrated. 227	
 228	
Following each demonstration, the demonstrator pretended to re-fill the box behind the 229	
occluder, but swapped it with a replica box, which was identical in dimensions and external 230	
appearance except that it did not actually open (the groove resembled that of the other box, 231	
but in reality was not deep enough to open).  The use of a replica maximised the chances of 232	
observing imitation once species-typical solutions were discovered to be ineffective.  233	
 234	
During the test phase, each participant was provided with a replica box, without verbal 235	
instruction. Participants were given up to two minutes to interact with the box. Regardless of 236	
performance, all participants were rewarded at the end of the trial.  Trials were videotaped 237	
using a digital Sony Handy-camcorder mounted on a tripod. 238	
 239	
Coding 240	
The occurrence of accurate matches of any of the four demonstrated actions was coded from 241	
video (yes or no). A second coder, blind to the hypotheses and conditions re-coded 25% of 242	
the videos. Inter-observer reliability across all conditions was excellent (Cohen’s Kappa = 243	
0.94, SE = 0.05). Full details of coding protocol are provided in the SI Text. 244	
 245	
Ethical statement  246	
We received ethical clearance from the University of Birmingham Ethical Review Committee 247	
(ERN_13-1412) and the Marie Curie European Commission Ethical Screening Program (n° 248	
628763). This study conformed to University of Birmingham’s Code of Practice for 249	
Research. For children, we received full approval and ethical clearance from ThinkTank 250	
Museum and full informed consent from parents. For the bonobos, we received full ethical 251	
approval to conduct this study from ‘Les Amis des Bonobos du Congo’ (ABC, Lola ya 252	
Bonobo Sanctuary). This study complied with all legal requirements required for conducting 253	




We observed high levels of spontaneous imitation by children across both uncommon (‘Rub 258	
–Rotate’) and typical (‘Cross-Trace’) action conditions. The majority of children readily 259	
copied at least one the two observed actions in both conditions (Rub-Rotate: 77.8% of 260	
children (21/27); Cross & Trace: 81% of children (21/26)). Of these children, approximately 261	
one third spontaneously copied both actions demonstrated to them (Rub-Rotate: 39% children 262	
(8/27); Cross & Trace: 27% children (7/26)), see Figure 2. For cases where children only 263	
copied one of the two actions, in both conditions it was most often the second action which 264	
was copied, suggesting a working memory constraint and/or a recency effect (for single 265	
action responses, copying of the second demonstrated action occurred in 10/13 cases for Rub-266	
Rotate and 12/15 cases for Cross-Trace). During a Control condition, where everything 267	
remained the same except that no demonstration was performed, no child (N = 19) performed 268	
any of the target actions. In all cases of copying, the children copied the demonstrated 269	
(causally-irrelevant) actions first, before potentially performing any causally-relevant actions 270	
to open the box (i.e. prying open the box). 271	
 272	
In contrast, no bonobo in our sample copied any of the target actions in either condition. 273	
Instead, they attempted to open the box using an array of causally relevant, species-typical 274	
methods, which included pounding, biting, kicking and shaking. As no bonobo demonstrated 275	
any of the actions, we did not run a Control condition for the bonobos.   276	
 277	
Requests for assistance occurred in both species, but more in children, which is not surprising 278	
given their language skills. Fourty-eight percent (14/29) of children made direct verbal 279	
requests (e.g. “It’s too hard for me, can you do it?”) and/or gestural requests. Although 280	
actively returning things objects in one’s possession is not typically observed in great apes, 281	
21.8% of bonobos (10/46) in our sample actively returned the box to the experimenter after 282	




Our study identified striking contrasts in young children’s copying behavior as compared to 287	
that of bonobos, our closest living relatives.  Children readily copied the actions, which were 288	
visibly causally-irrelevant, whereas not a single bonobo did. Whether or not the bonobos 289	
were unable, unwilling, or both, to copy, the results highlight striking differences in human 290	
children’s cultural behaviors as compared to those of great apes. Importantly, our study 291	
addressed methodological constraints of previous studies, thus providing a true test for over-292	
imitation which allowed us to compare the performances of both children and great apes. 293	
Combining our results with earlier findings for chimpanzees (Tennie et al., 2012; Tomasello 294	
et al., 1997), our findings indicate that bodily over-imitation – at least in high frequencies – is 295	
a uniquely human capacity, which likely plays a key role in explaining why human culture 296	
can accumulate over time. 297	
 298	
This study focussed on bonobos, an understudied species of great ape that might be expected 299	
to show higher imitative potential than chimpanzees, given their enhanced social orientation 300	
(Kano et al., 2015; Kret et al., 2016) and high social tolerance (Hare & Kwetuenda 2010). 301	
The fact that the bonobos failed to over-imitate demonstrates that even enhanced social 302	
orientation may not be enough to trigger human-like cultural learning behaviors. These 303	
results thus demonstrate an important qualitative difference between humans and great apes 304	
in regards to the capacity or motivation to copy visibly causally-irrelevant actions. 305	
Differences in the capacity for action-copying may relate to cognitive constraints in great 306	
apes’ abilities to understand goals and intentions as humans do (Call & Tomasello, 2008). 307	
Differences in motivation are likely to relate to the strong affiliative and normative drivers of 308	
imitation in humans but not in great apes (Over & Carpenter, 2012; Legare & Nielsen, 2015).  309	
 310	
An alternative explanation to the lack of copying by the apes is that it was due to 311	
methodological constraints. However, although small sample size is frequently a critique of 312	
great ape studies, this was not the case for our study. The combined results from the two 313	
related studies also make this explanation unlikely for chimpanzees (Tennie et al., 2012; 314	
Tomasello et al., 1997).  Age is also unlikely to be an explanatory factor, given that a full age 315	
range was tested, and no subject showed evidence of copying.  Another possibility is that 316	
using a human demonstrator inhibited the bonobos’ motivation to imitate. However, a 317	
conspecific demonstrator was used in both chimpanzee studies (Tennie et al., 2012; 318	
Tomasello et al., 1997), yet no novel action copying occurred. Moreover, in a review of 23 319	
studies directly comparing chimpanzee and human performance in experimental settings, 320	
Boesch (Boesch, 2007) concluded that the use of human demonstrators did not seem to 321	
influence observed species differences. Lack of motivation also does not appear to be a 322	
problem: the majority of apes persisted in this task and employed many alternative techniques 323	
while trying to open the box. 324	
 325	
Although previous studies have shown that great apes will sometimes copy in certain 326	
circumstances, it appears to primarily occur after receiving extensive training and/or 327	
enculturation (Bjorklund et al., 2000; Byrne & Tanner, 2006; Call, 2001; Carrasco et al., 328	
2009; Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995; Hayes & Hayes, 1952; Miles, Mitchell, & Harper, 329	
1996). Given that these factors are absent in wild apes, ecologically relevant findings must 330	
therefore come from untrained and un-enculturated apes. In our study, not a single untrained 331	
and non-enculturated bonobo copied any of the demonstrated actions, thus providing 332	
qualitative and ecologically-valid evidence of the distinctive nature of the human cultural 333	
capacity as compared to that great apes: the copying of visibly causally-irrelevant actions 334	
(especially novel actions) appears to be uniquely human. 335	
 336	
One relevant question is why children were so willing to copy these superfluous actions? It 337	
has been suggested that children copy in a blanket fashion due to the causal-opaqueness of a 338	
task (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007).  However, children’s over-imitation is also  339	
influenced by social motivations, such as to socially bond (Over & Carpenter, 2012)  or 340	
conform to perceived rituals or norms, which are themselves initially opaque (Kenward, 341	
2012; Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Hermann et al., 2013; Keupp et al., 2013; Legare 342	
& Nielsen 2015). The main answer therefore is likely to be the hyper-social nature of humans 343	
as compared to other animals (Claidiere, Bowler & Whiten, 2011; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, 344	
Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012; Tomasello, 2014).  The fact that the adult demonstrator 345	
remained present during the test phase in our study is likely to have enhanced the children’s 346	
motivation to copy (Harris, 2012; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Tomasello, 2014). It is well known 347	
that children are more likely to copy causally-irrelevant actions performed by adults as 348	
compared to by peers (Flynn, 2008; Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan et al., 2011; Wood, 349	
Kendal & Flynn, 2012).  Children are also more likely to copy in the physical presence of 350	
adult observers as compared to if they leave the room (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). In this 351	
regard, young children in this study may have perceived the presence of an adult observer 352	
during the imitation phase as an implicit cue to over-imitate. While this may be the case, it 353	
could be likewise expected that over-imitation in great apes would be also be more likely to 354	
occur within an observer’s presence. The striking absence of over-imitation for the bonobos 355	
even in such a context thus further highlights the apparently stark species differences that 356	
exist in this cultural capacity.    357	
 358	
In sum, our results highlight profound differences in the cultural behaviors of human children 359	
as compared to great apes. The copying of causally-irrelevant actions represents a core 360	
component for both material and social cultures in human, and thus the striking difference 361	
between children and great apes in this regard provides critical insights into why both the 362	
diversity and frequency of human cultural behaviors differ so vastly differ compared to that 363	
of other great apes (Acerbi & Tennie, 2016). 364	
 365	
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Figure 1. Image of the wooden box stimuli used in the imitation experiment (also showing a 568	
reward sticker provided to child participants) 569	
 570	
Figure 2. Results showing proportion of child (N = 52) and bonobo (N = 46) participants that 571	
spontaneously imitated the observed actions in the (A) Uncommon (“Rub-rotate”) condition 572	
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